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Abstract
We consider the e¢ cient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a
quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modelling interdependent preferences distinguishing between “payo¤ types” and “belief types” and report a characterization of when the e¢ cient allocation can be partially Bayesian implemented on a …nite
type space. The characterization can be used to unify a number of su¢ cient conditions
for e¢ cient partial implementation in this classical auction setting.
We report how a canonical language for discussing interdependent types - developed
in a more general setting by Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011) - applies in this
setting and note by example that this canonical language will not allow us to distinguish
some types in the payo¤ type - belief type language.
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1

Introduction

Before the work of Harsanyi (1967/68) economists used to routinely argue that game theory
could not be applied to economic settings because it required common knowledge of the
environment. Following Harsanyi (1967/68), economists accepted that rich enough “type
spaces”allowed any possible lack of common knowledge to be incorporated. But very rich type
spaces would be needed and applied work remains highly sensitive to sometimes unexamined
modelling choices about types. Nowhere is this more true than in mechanism design.
Two of us have written a series of papers highlighting the importance of lack of common
knowledge and rich type spaces in mechanism design, now to be collected together in a book
(Bergemann and Morris (2012)). Abreu and Matsushima (1992) showed that types that cannot
be distinguished in this language may always pool in some equilibrium and thus the e¢ cient
allocation can only be fully implemented if it is measurable with respect to statements that
can be expressed in this language.

2

Partial Implementation

There are I agents. Each agent i has a “payo¤ type”

i

belonging to a …nite set

agent i’s monetary valuation of a good depends on the pro…le of payo¤ types
and is given by a valuation function vi :
their own payo¤ type

i

I

1

i.

Each

= ( 1; : : : ;

I)

! R+ . Agents are assumed to know

but we want to allow for rich beliefs and higher order beliefs. Thus

we assume each agent has a “type” ti belonging to a …nite set Ti , and write bi : Ti !

a function describing an agent’s payo¤ type and bi : Ti !

i

for

(T i ) for his belief type. This

decomposition of an agent’s type into a payo¤ type and a belief type is a natural one in this
2

quasi-linear setting. Two of us used this implicit description of interdependent types in our
work on robust mechanism design (Bergemann and Morris (2012)). We will discuss brie‡y
below a sense in which this decomposition can be seen as without loss of generality.
We will focus on the problem of allocating the object to the agent with the highest valuation. Write i ( ) for the agent who values the object the most, i.e., i ( ) 2 arg maxi vi ( ),
and in this …nite type setting, we can assume without loss of generality that i ( ) is uniquely
de…ned. We are interested in designing a …nite mechanism involving monetary transfers which
has an equilibrium where the object is always allocated to the agent who values it the most.
By the revelation principle, we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms. In this context,
a direct mechanism consists of a rule specifying monetary transfers to all agents, y : T ! RI .
Now if agents report themselves to be of the type pro…le t = (t1 ; : : : ; tI ), the object will be
allocated to agent i

b (t) , where we write b (t) = b1 (t1 ) ; : : : ; bI (tI ) , and each agent i

will receive a monetary transfer yi (t). This direct mechanism will be incentive compatible if
ti 2 arg max
t0i 2Ti

t

X

i 2T i

Ii b (t0i ; t i ) vi b (ti ; t i ) + yi (t0i ; t i ) bi (t i jti ) ,

where the indicator function Ii ( ) of agent i is one if i = i

(1)

b (t) , and zero otherwise. Thus

we say e¢ cient partial implementation is possible if and only if there exists y : T ! RI such
that (1) is satis…ed.
To give a characterization of the incentive compatibility of the e¢ cient social choice function i , or short, the e¢ cient partial implementation, it is useful to …rst identify key properties
of players’incentives to report their payo¤ types for beliefs about others’payo¤ types. Fix an
agent i and …x his beliefs about the payo¤ types of others,

i

2

(

i ).

Suppose that agent

i expects the object to be allocated according to i based on the truthful reports of other
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agents and his own (true or false) report. By extension of the valuation function vi , we write
Vi ( i ; 0i ;

i)

payo¤ type
subset

so that Vi ( i ; 0i ;

i,

i;

i

K
1
i;:::; i

in

i)

,

P

i

(Ii ( 0i ;

i)

Ii ( i ;

say that Vi is cyclically monotonic on (

i;

i;

Vi ( i ; 0i ;

(

i ) vi

( i;

i ).

Fix a

1 2
i; i;

i

+ Vi

2 3
i; i;

i

+

1
K
i ; i;

+ Vi

i)

+ y i ( 0i ) for all

0
i; i

2

i

i

i

0.

! R such that Vi ( i ; i ;

i )+

if and only if Vi is cyclically monotonic on

Thus cyclic monotonicity tells us that - ignoring belief types beyond the induced

i ).

beliefs

i

if, for every sequence of types

i)

Now, Theorem 1 in Rochet (1987) shows that there exists y i :

(

i ))

relative to his true

i,

Vi

yi ( i)

0
i

for the expected utility gain of agent i from a misreport

i

over the payo¤ types - it is possible to choose transfers that give an agent an

incentive to report his payo¤ type truthfully. To state this precisely, it will be useful to
introduce the mapping b i :

which describes the beliefs over payo¤ types
n
o
b
b
induced by the agents’belief types, so that i ( i ) [ i ] , i t i : i (t i ) = i
for any
i

2

(T i ) !

(

i)

(T i ). Now the incentive compatibility condition (1) can be re-written as:
ti 2 arg max Vi bi (ti ) ; bi (t0i ) ; b i (bi (ti )) +
t0i 2Ti

t

X

i 2T i

yi (t0i ; t i ) bi (t i jti )

(2)

Now we consider what we can learn about agents’beliefs and how we can use what we learn.
The classical environment we are considering - with quasi-linear utility and no limited liability
constraints - is well-known to be very permissive in allowing “belief extraction”. As observed
by d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979), Myerson (1981) and Cremer and McLean (1985),
it is possible to elicit agents’beliefs over other types by o¤ering them gambles. Our general
characterization of e¢ cient partial implementation will essentially state that agents’ beliefs
can be elicited “for free”and what then matters is whether the set of payo¤ types consistent
4

with a given belief type can be distinguished. But this reduces to a cyclic monotonicity
condition. Thus write b i ( i ) for the set of payo¤ types of player i associated with belief type
n
o
b
b
i , so that
i ( i) =
i 2
i j9ti with bi (ti ) = i and i (ti ) = i . Now we have:
Proposition 1 E¢ cient partial implementation is possible if and only if each Vi satis…es
b i ( i ) ; b i ( i ) for each

cyclic monotonicity on

i

in the range of bi .

Proof. Suppose e¢ cient partial implementation is possible and so (2) holds for some
y : T ! RI . For any agent i,
type ti with bi (ti ) =

By (2), Vi

i; i;

i

i

in the range of bi and

and bi (ti ) =

b i ( i) + yi ( i;

i.

i)

De…ne y i ( i ;

Vi

Thus Vi satis…es cyclic monotonicity on

0
i; i;

Vi

0
i; i;

0 for any

b i ( i ) +y i ( 0 ;
i
0
i

6=

i,

i)

i)

i)

2 b i ( i ), write b
ti ( i ;
=

0
i

t

i

b i ( i) + yi ( 0 ;
i
b i ( i) ; b i ( i)

: b i ( i ) ! R such that Vi

for all i ;

P

b i ( i) ; b i ( i) .

Suppose Vi satis…es cyclic monotonicity on
of bi . Thus there exists y i ( ;

i

P
2 b i ( i ). Since t i (log

yi b
ti ( i ;
i)

for any

i) ; t i
0
i; i

for all

for each
i; i;

i)

i

log

(t i ).

2 b i ( i ).

in the range

b i ( i) + yi ( i;

i (t i )

i

i)

0
i (t i )) i (t i )

>

(2) holds for y : T ! RI given by yi (t) = y i (bi (ti ); bi (ti )) + K log bi (ti )[t i ]

with su¢ ciently large K.

We note that the present result of partial implementation is stated for the (ex post) e¢ cient
allocation rule i ( ). But in fact, the above result is more generally valid for every allocation
rule that is measurable with respect to the payo¤ type pro…le . The only modi…cation arises
with respect to the utility gains Vi ( ) from misreporting the payo¤ type,

i

to

0
i,

which have

to be adapted to the speci…c allocation rule. In fact, a slightly more general version of this
result was reported in Proposition 6.2 of Bergemann and Morris (2003), a working paper
version of Bergemann and Morris (2005), where general allocation problems were considered.
5

In any case, the present result gives a sharp characterization of how payo¤ types and belief
types matter for e¢ cient partial implementation. In particular, di¤erences in beliefs about
others’ types can be extracted for free, even if they are not payo¤ relevant. But once they
are extracted, the non-payo¤ relevant content of the beliefs does not matter. All that matters
is the implied belief over payo¤ types and the cyclic monotonicity condition given by that
implied belief over the payo¤ types and the set of possible payo¤ types who could have had
the original (perhaps payo¤ irrelevant) belief. Classic su¢ cient conditions for e¢ cient partial
implementation can now be seen as special cases of the above Proposition:
1. Private Values. Under private values (i.e., vi ( i ;

i)

does not depend on

i ),

the

condition becomes vacuous as the cyclic monotonicity conditions are satis…ed.
2. Independent Types. If the agents’types are distributed independently (bi (ti ) does not
depend on ti ), then necessary and su¢ cient conditions for e¢ cient partial implementation
reduce to the cyclic monotonicity conditions on the entire set

i

of payo¤ types of each agent

i for his …xed beliefs over others’payo¤ types.
3. Linear Independence and Convex Hull. As noted by our discussant, Eric Maskin, for
any set

i

of linearly independent beliefs over others’ payo¤ types, the cyclic monotonicity

conditions on entire

i

for all beliefs in

i

are su¢ cient for e¢ cient partial implementation if

there is common knowledge that beliefs lie in the convex hull of
than the notion of ex post equilibrium.

i,

which is less demanding

In a similar spirit, Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn and

Moldovanu (2011) investigate conditions for local robust incentive compatibility, and their
Lemma 1 establishes necessary monotonicity conditions for partial implementation, using the
above separation of payo¤ types and belief types.
4. Belief Extraction. Following Neeman (2004), say that “beliefs determine preferences”
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(BDP) if for every
and bi (ti ) =

i

i

2

(T i ), there exists at most one

i

2

i

such that bi (ti ) =

i

for some ti 2 Ti . Under BDP, the cyclic monotonicity requirements of the

proposition become vacuous.1
5. Ex Post Incentive Compatibility. As in the work of Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta
and Maskin (2000), suppose that a single crossing condition is satis…ed with respect to the
(ordered) payo¤ types of the agents, so that each vi is strictly monotonic in
vi ( 0i ;

i)

vi ( i ;

monotonicity on (

i)
i;

> vj ( 0i ;
i)

i)

for every

vj ( i ;
i

i)

i

and

0
i

>

i

)

for all i; j with i 6= j. Then Vi satis…es cyclic

(which implies ex post incentive compatibility) and thus

again it can be shown that the cyclic monotonicity requirements of the proposition hold.2
6. Combining Belief Extraction and Private Values. McLean and Postlewaite (2004) analyze e¢ cient auctions with interdependent values and multidimensional types. More precisely, each agent has a two-dimensional payo¤ type
and a common component,
vi ( ) = vii

i
i

i
i

c
i

and

i

=

i c
i; i

, with an idiosyncratic

respectively, as re‡ected by the valuation function

+ vic ( c ). The common part of the valuation, vic ( c ), depends on the en-

tire pro…le of common components

c

= ( c1 ; : : : ;

c
I ).

Now, in terms of our language, their

environment in Section 4 can be described by a type space Ti =

i,

the payo¤ types can be de-

scribed by the identity mapping bi , and the belief types can be described by
1

i

[ i ] ( j )j6=i =

Arguments going back at least to Cremer and McLean (1985) say BDP holds generically on …nite type

spaces, since if we …x a …nite set of types and perturb beliefs, then they will all be di¤erent and BDP will hold.
Recent contributions, notably Heifetz and Neeman (2006) and Chen and Xiong (2011), examine when BDP
holds on in…nite type spaces, and in particular if it can be said to hold “generically” on in…nite type spaces.
2

Such su¢ cient conditions do not naturally arise in multidimensional payo¤ type space

i,

expect for some

special cases, as noted by Maskin (1992) and shown in much more general environments by Jehiel et al. (2006).

7

c
i

c
j j6=i

[ ci ]

j
j j6=i

i
i

. Finally, their condition of positive informational variability imc
i

plies that the common component
i
i

private information

can be extracted from every agent i, and the residual

is independent and pertains to the private value, and hence again, our

necessary and su¢ cient conditions are satis…ed.

3

Interdependent Types and Full Implementation

Importantly, Proposition 1 only establishes partial implementation, i.e. that the e¢ cient
allocation arises in some equilibrium but there may exist other equilibria with ine¢ cient
allocations. Suppose there are three agents, I = 3, and each agent has two possible types,
1

=

2

=

3

= f0; 1g. Each agent’s valuation of the object is given by
vi ( ) =

i+

2X
3 j6=i

j.

(3)

Each agent has only two types, and thus a single belief type for each payo¤ type. Suppose,
in particular, that if a type has valuation
the other agents having valuation

j

=

i,

i,

he assigns independent probability

and the remaining probability

7
8

to

j

1
8

to each of
i.

=1

E¢ cient partial implementation is possible in this example (by both a belief extraction
argument, i.e., su¢ cient condition 3 above, or an ex post incentive compatibility argument,
e.g., su¢ cient condition 4 above). But observe that each type of each agent has an expected
value of
(or

3)

is

7
6
1
8

for the object. To see why, note that if agent 1 say has
and thus his expectation of

his expectation of

2

(or

3)

is

7
8

2
2
1+ 3 2+ 3 3

1

= 1, his expectation of

1
1
= 1+ 12
+ 12
= 76 . But if agent 1 has

and thus his expectation of

1

+ 23

2

+ 23

3

1

2

= 0,

7
7
= 0 + 12
+ 12
= 76 .

Thus, there will always be an equilibrium where both types of each player behave the same,
which cannot give rise to the e¢ cient allocation, as shown in a general payo¤ environment in
8

Bergemann and Morris (2009).
Following Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011), we propose a natural description of
agents’types in this setting. An agent’s (unconditional) willingness to pay for the object does
not depend on other agents’types and thus has a natural meaning. If it makes sense to speak
of all agents’willingness to pay for the object, it makes sense to talk about an agent’s beliefs
about other agents’willingness to pay for the object, and his willingness to pay conditional on
others’willingness to pay for the object. Call the agent’s unconditional willingness to pay his
…rst order type. Call his beliefs over others’willingness to pay and conditional willingness to
pay his second order type. Now we can inductively de…ne an agent’s (n + 1)th order type to
be his beliefs over others’nth order types and his willingness to pay conditional on others’nth
order types. We can thus identify an agent with a hierarchy of statements about preferences
and conditional preferences.
In the simple setting of this note, such hierarchies can be de…ned formally as follows. An
nth level type is pair tn = (bn ; vn ) consisting of a belief component and valuation component.
Write Tn for the set of nth level types that can arise in a …nite type space. We describe the
sets Tn inductively. Let T1 = f?g

R+ with a typical 1st level type t1 = (?; v1 ) consisting

of a degenerate belief type and an unconditional valuation of the object. Now an (n + 1)th
level type tn+1 = (bn+1 ; vn+1 ) consists of a simple (i.e., …nite support) probability distribution
bn+1 2

(Tn ) with support supp(bn+1 ) and a valuation function vn+1 : supp(bn+1 ) ! R+ . Now

a hierarchy of types is a sequence of nth order types (t1 ; t2 ; : : : ; tn ; : : :) 2 T1 T2

Tn

.

A sequence of types is coherent if each (n + 1)th type tn+1 induces beliefs over other agents’
(n

1)th level types and willingness to pay conditional on other agents’(n

1)th level types

that are consistent with those of tn . (We omit the formal statement of this condition). Now if
9

we write Tf for the set of all coherent hierarchies of higher order types that can arise in …nite
type spaces, we have a natural language in which to discuss agents’types.
In Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011), we discuss the extension to in…nite types
and construct a universal space of higher order preferences T from hierarchies. We can
identify those hierarchies with beliefs over others’types and valuations conditional on their
hierarchies. Thus we identify a type t 2 T with a probability measure over the types of
others b 2
(T )I

1

(T )I

1

and an equivalence class of b -integrable valuation functions v :

! R (where we identify two functions if they agree b -almost surely). In this sense,

we have a canonical way of representing type spaces with a decomposition of types into “payo¤
types” and “belief types,” as we did earlier. However, it is important to realize that these
payo¤ types does not specify valuations on 0-probability events.
This language is closely related to full implementation. Abreu and Matsushima (1992)
showed that a necessary condition for Bayesian full implementation of a social choice function
using a …nite mechanism on a …nite type space was that two types which had the same hierarchies of preferences received the same allocation. While they expressed this “measurability”
condition as a property of the …xed …nite type space, it can be expressed without reference
to a particular …nite type space as we described above. Thus, if full implementation is required, we can at most achieve constrained e¢ ciency, with the object allocated to the agent
i (t1 ; : : : ; tI ) that maximizes vi [ti ](t i ), where vi [ti ] denotes the payo¤ type component of ti ,
and Proposition 1 must hold on the coarser type space where types with the same hierarchy
of preferences are merged.
Exact full implementation is generally not possible in the allocation of a single good: even
with private values, while bidding one’s true value is a dominant strategy, it is often only a
10

weak best response and it is easy to construct ine¢ cient equilibria in dominated strategies.
For su¢ cient conditions for full implementation with …nite mechanisms, the objective must
be weakened to virtual implementation, so that i (t1 ; : : : ; tI ) is allocated the object with
arbitrarily high probability. Abreu and Matsushima (1992) showed that virtual Bayesian full
implementation is possible under Bayesian incentive compatibility and their measurability
condition. In this context, this implies that constrained e¢ cient allocation of the good is
possible if the condition of Proposition 1 holds on the coarsened type space that is expressible
in our language.3

3

In Bergemann and Morris (2009), we examined the e¢ cient allocation rule (with the single unit auction as

a special case) and gave conditions under which full implementation can be achieved by a simpler mechanism,
namely the direct mechanism, than the mechanism of Abreu and Matsushima (1992). It is an open question
when a simpler mechanism can achieve full implemetation more generally.

11

References
[1] Abreu, D. and H. Matsushima (1992). “Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information.”mimeo.
[2] d’Aspremont, C. and L.-A. Gerard-Varet (1979). “Incentives and Incomplete Information,”Journal of Public Economics 11, 25-45.
[3] Bergemann, D., and S. Morris (2003). “Robust Mechanism Design,” Cowles Foundation
Discussion Paper #1421.
[4] — (2005). “Robust Mechanism Design,”Econometrica 73, 1771-1813.
[5] — (2009). “Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms”Review of Economic Studies,
76, 1175-1204.
[6] — (2011). “Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction,”Cowles Foundation Discussion
Paper #1818.
[7] — (2012). Robust Mechanism Design: The Role of Private Information and Higher Order
Beliefs. World Scienti…c Publishing, Singapore.
[8] Bergemann, D., S. Morris and S. Takahashi (2011). “Interdependent Preferences and
Strategic Distinguishability,”Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper #1772R.
[9] Chen, Y.-C., and S. Xiong (2011). “Genericity and the Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction,”forthcoming in Econometrica.

12

[10] Cremer, J. and R. McLean (1985). “Optimal Selling Strategies Under Uncertainty for a
Discriminating Monopolist When Demands are Interdependent,” Econometrica 53, 345361.
[11] Dasgupta, P. and E. Maskin (2000). “E¢ cient Auctions,”Quarterly Journal of Economics
115, 341-388.
[12] Harsanyi, J. (1967-68). “Games with incomplete information player by Bayesian players,
I, II and III,”Management Science 14, 159-182, 320-334 and 486-502.
[13] Heifetz, A. and Z. Neeman (2006). “On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design,”Econometrica 74, 213-294.
[14] Jehiel, P., B. Moldovanu, and M. Meyer-ter-Vehn (2012). “Locally Robust Implementation and Its Limits,”mimeo.
[15] Jehiel, P., B. Moldovanu, M. Meyer-ter-Vehn and B. Zame (2006). “The Limits of Ex
Post Implementation,”Econometrica 74, 585-610.
[16] Maskin, E. (1992). “Auctions and Privatization,”in Privatization: Symposium in Honor
of Herbert Giersch, ed. by H. Siebert, pp. 115-136. J.C.B. Mohr, Tuebingen.
[17] Mertens, J.-F. and S. Zamir (1985). “Formulation of Bayesian analysis for game with
incomplete information,”International Journal of Game Theory 14, 1-29.
[18] McLean, R. and A. Postlewaite (2002). “Informational Size and E¢ cient Auctions,”Review of Economic Studies 71, 809-827.

13

[19] Myerson, R. (1981). “Optimal Auction Design,” Mathematics of Operations Research 6,
53-73.
[20] Neeman, Z. (2004). “The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design,”Journal of Economic Theory 117, 55-77.
[21] Rochet, J.-C. (1987). “A Necessary and Su¢ cient Condition for Rationalizability in a
Quasi-Linear Context,”Journal of Mathematical Economics 16, 191-200.

14

